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Maury Obstfeld (this volume) covers three deep topics in this paper. The Triffin 
Dilemma, Liquidity, and Global Imbalances. This paper presents the balanced views on 
wide-range of topics: from old to new and from academic to policy-oriented.   
 
The first topic was the Triffin Dilemma. The classic Triffin Dilemma is about the 
impossibility of having and maintaining credibility of the international reserve currency, 
namely the US dollar: Current account deficits of the US is needed to provide 
international liquidity, but more liquidity means accumulated deficits, which would 
eventually lead to loss of credibility and eventual devaluation of the key currency. 
Obstfeld correctly points out that the classic version of the Triffin Dilemma became is 
not valid anymore in the modern world of free capital flows.      However, he argues that 
there is now a modern version of the Triffin Dilemma. Since reserve assets of the 
emerging market economy has to consist of liquid and safe assets, only assets that 
qualify are US Treasuries. Hence, in order to provide liquidity, the US has to run fiscal 
deficits. Or, larger and larger deficits can be absorbed by the emerging market (EM) 
countries, as long as EM countries continue to grow. This is another way of looking at 
the exorbitant privilege of the key currency country.   
 
A small puzzle is that no other advance country is providing reserve assets. According to 
the IMF, COFER statistics, the US dollar consists of 62% of global reserve assets in 
2009, down from 72% in 2001. The decrease in US dollar is mostly matched by the 
increase in Euro (19% in 2001 to 28% in 2009). So, is the Euro on its way to share the 
status of the reserve currency? We might have thought so, until the European debt 
crisis erupted in 2010/11. As of this writing, Greece government bonds are on the verge 
of default (Credit Default Swap shows the default probability of 98%), and yields of 
several other countries in the Euro zone are rising and deviating from German bonds.   
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Obstfeld considers several scenarios for the future of the Triffin Dilemma. One 
possibility is that EM countries start accumulating risky assets rather than traditional 
reserve assets. This takes off the burden of issuing more and more Treasuries on the 
part of the US, and higher returns can be pursued. After accumulating so much reserve 
assets, China and Korea established their versions of Sovereign Wealth Fund, modeling 
after a Singaporean one. Having reasonably high reserve level, extra buffer can be 
managed with a portfolio with slightly higher risk, and slightly higher return category. 
Hence, this scenario is very likely. The second possibility that Obstfeld considers is 
deceleration of EM countries. But, if convergence in the per-capital income is expected 
to take place, high economic growth of BRICs for another decade or two is very likely. 
The third scenario is that some countries graduate from attack-prone EM country 
status and become stable advanced countries. The best precedent is Japan.   
 
The second topic is liquidity. Many EM economies suffered financial crises resulting 
from sudden capital outflows in the last two decades: the Mexican crisis of 1994/95, the 
Asian crisis of 1997/98, and subsequent crises in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, and 
some emerging market economies during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09. These 
crises were characterized as a liquidity crisis.   
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was supposed to be a leading organization to 
provide liquidity to countries that are temporarily in shortage of international reserves. 
However, for several reasons, the IMF could not provide sufficient liquidity to these 
crisis-hit countries. One of the reasons was the IMF itself did not have unlimited source 
of liquidity—it is not a central bank, after all. Another reason is that there was a limit 
that one country can borrow from the IMF in proportion to its contribution toward IMF 
quota. Countries, i.e., members of the IMF, could borrow under Stand-by Arrangement 
(SBA) only up to the 3 times of its contribution of IMF, i.e., quota, before the Mexican 
crisis occurred. This was called an access limit. During the Mexican crisis management, 
the access limit was raised to 5 times. Later, during the Korean crisis management, the 
access limit was raised to 20 times of quota under a new facility, Supplemental Reserve 
Facility (SRF). If it is a good thing to have an international lender of last resort, these 
two limitations had to be removed. Moreover, policy conditions—conditionality—were 
vastly unpopular among the liquidity recipient countries.   
 
Whether it is a good thing to have an international lender of last resort is an old 
question. Most famously, it was debated between Harry Dexter White and John 3 
 
Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods conference that essentially created the IMF and 
the World Bank. Keynes advocated that Bancor to be issued by IMF as international 
reserve currency, while White opposed to the idea, and instead argued the gold-dollar 
peg system that later was adopted.   
 
During the EM financial crises in the 1990s, voices that blame EM countries for poor 
macroeconomic policies and crony capitalism were strong and unconditional liquidity 
provision was not favored. Instead, the IMF imposed structural conditionalities that 
might help a country to raise their potential growth rate in the long run, but irrelevant 
in the urgent liquidity needs. EM countries maintained that they were the victims of 
volatile capital flows. Either capital controls to regulate inflows should be allowed or 
liquidity provision without structural conditionality when sudden outflow occurs should 
be provided. The IMF conditionalities and countries’ not meeting them seriously eroded 
market confidence in the country. Asian countries felt conditionalities were misguided 
or mistimed so that they became part of problem instead of part of solution. After dust 
settled, Asian countries started to accumulate foreign reserves in order to protect 
themselves from future crisis. This would become known as a “self-insurance” motive of 
reserve accumulation, which will be discussed below.     
 
During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09, especially after the Lehman Brothers 
failure of September 2008, the United States and European central banks and 
Treasuries provided almost unlimited dollar provision and capital injection to western 
banks.  
 
As of this writing, the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-11 has become a test of 
political will among the Euro area countries, whether to provide unlimited liquidity to 
fiscal deficit countries or to allow Greece to default with large haircut.   
 
In the wake of the Asian crisis, the IMF has attempted to overcome the problems of 
access limit and stringent conditionality in response to the criticism against the IMF. A 
basic idea is to certify a country with strong fundamentals to be a status of qualified to 
credit line without conditionality or negotiation should the need for liquidity emerges.  
A series of new facilities have been introduced with little success: Contingent Credit 
Lines (CCL), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL).  The 
CCL was abolished without any applicant, and FCL and PCL applicant countries are 
limited to several countries mostly European peripheral countries. 4 
 
 
During the Global Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York extended a 
swap arrangement to central banks of four emerging market economies (Korea, 
Singapore, Mexico, and Brazil in October 2008) as well as major advanced countries’ 
central banks. The swap agreement did help Korea to overcome vulnerability to its 
currency (See Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2011)). This showed that Federal 
Reserve instead of IMF could act as liquidity provider to EM countries, if it chooses to 
do so.    However, this was a very exceptional case where internationally active western 
banks were in shortage of dollar funds and withdrawing their funds, i.e., deleveraging, 
from all over the world.   
 
As Obstfeld argues, there are several well-known objections to having international 
lender of last resort, even if it can be possible. First, that may encourage fiscal 
authorities to be irresponsible. This is an extension of the logic that the central bank 
should not buy newly issued government debt in the domestic context. Moral hazard of 
the fiscal authority should be prevented. Second, having international lender of last 
resort may make EM countries to be careless in management of its external liabilities of 
the banking sector as well as fiscal authorities.   
 
My comments to this topic are as follows. However, moral hazard is not necessarily 
limited to borrowers. If the lender of last resort is expected to rescue the indebted 
countries, lenders to EM countries and banks in EM countries may underestimate risks 
and lend too much. In fact, every “bail out” operation that the IMF is engaged in, a 
criticism in the nature of “who really is bailed out.” The criticism goes as follows: In the 
case of the Mexican crisis, it was not Mexico that was bailed out, but the Wall Street 
lenders (holders of Mexican government debt securities); in the case of Asian crises, it 
was not Thailand, Indonesia and Korea that were rescued, but Japanese and western 
banks that had lent to banks of these countries. Those who emphasizes the lenders’ 
responsibility often advocate the private sector involvement (PSI), that is, haircut for 
liabilities as a part of solving the sovereign/banking crisis. 
 
In order to discuss the lender of last resort, it is essential to distinguish illiquidity and 
insolvency. For illiquidity, IMF facilities (FCL and PCL) can be expanded, and central 
banks can provide liquidity, and for insolvency, insolvency procedures can be devised 
and introduced. The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by 
First Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger in 2002 was such an attempt, although 5 
 
it was not materialized. But the distinction is often blurred. Illiquid banks and 
countries may become insolvent, if liquidity is not provided in time. 
 
It is often argued that the Lender of Last Resort operation should come with the higher 
interest rate in order to avoid moral hazard. (This is an application of the Bagehot rule.)   
The SRF was constructed on this principle. Korea borrowed under SRF at the high 
interest rate in December 1997, but repaid within a year, by generating large surpluses.   
 
Asian countries, most notably China, have massively accumulated foreign reserves from 
1999 to 2007. The phenomenon is often called self-protection, since those countries 
explicitly desired to avoid future liquidity crisis, without help of the IMF. They have 
stigma with IMF conditionality.     
 
When the global financial crisis came, some of these countries experienced the capital 
outflows. Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2011) showed the following: First, the EM 
countries did use accumulated foreign reserves to moderate the currency depreciation 
pressure. There were marked decline in foreign reserves of some of the Asian countries, 
including Korea. Second, those with higher reserves before the onset of the 2007-09 
crisis experienced better growth recovery in 2009-10. In a sense, self-protection worked. 
 
The third topic is the exchange rate and global imbalances. Obstfeld illustrates that the 
exchange rate regime decision may depend on the exchange rate decision of other 
(export competing) countries. His example is China and Brazil. A Nash equilibrium 
problem is explained. A similar theoretical framework has been pointed out in the wake 
of the Asian currency crisis. Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998), and Ito (2007) explained 
why East Asian countries maintained a dollar peg before the crisis. In East Asia, the 
intra-regional trade ratio is as high as the EU area. Hence, if one country departs from 
the fixed exchange rate and appreciates its currency, the country will be adversely 
affected in its competition in the region and also final destination of products, the 
United States. However, if they collectively floats against the US dollar and the 
European currencies, that is better. One way to achieve the joint float is to create an 
Asian regional monetary unit (RMU), just like ECU before the Euro, and each country 
pegs the currency to the RMU. 
 
Global imbalances have been a topic of international discussions since the mid-2000s. 
First, it was discussed in the IMF multilateral consultation and then G20-mutual 6 
 
assessment program (MAP). This year (2011), IMF started spillover reports for five 
countries, which examines the impact of macroeconomic policy on other countries. 
 
In general, current account imbalances per se cannot be a major concern. Presumably, if 
one country continues to run current account deficits, then external liabilities may 
become unsustainable. If the country to run deficits is the key currency country, like the 
United States, then the worry of the Triffin Dilemma re-appears, even in the flexible 
exchange rate world for advanced countries.   
 
My take on the exchange rate and global imbalances is as follows: Global imbalances 
become a symptom of something problematic, (only) when it is a reflection of the bad 
exchange rate policy. If the exchange rate regime of China is a problem, and there are 
several good arguments for this, then the exchange rate should be discussed instead of 
global imbalances. Discussing multilateral consultation, MAP, and spillover reports 
seem all waste of time, if the exchange rate is the issue.   
 
In conclusion, in light of Obstfeld paper and this discussion, the current Euro sovereign 
debt crisis can be put into perspectives. The origin of the Euro crisis is fiscal deficits. In 
that sense, the crisis is similar to the repeated crisis among the Latin American 
countries, including one with syndicated bank loans in the 1980s. So, fiscal austerity is 
obvious policy recommendation to these countries. If a country is insolvent (debts being 
unsustainable under plausible assumptions on growth and tax revenues), then debt 
reduction is necessary. Providing liquidity on the pretense of liquidity crisis will not 
solve the crisis. In that sense, the solution to the Greek crisis seems to be tilting toward 
orderly default. Germany insisted on the hair cut through “voluntary” rollover to longer 
maturity bonds, and this is part of the second rescue package. So, the crisis is in a 
different nature from the EM crisis, but the principle and challenges of providing 
assistance is the same. 
 
(This draft was written with information available on September 16, 2011) 
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